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Abstract— Molecular biology provides the ability to 
implement forms of information and network security completely 
outside the bounds of legacy security protocols and algorithms.  
This paper addresses an approach which instantiates the power 
of gene expression for security. Molecular biology provides a rich 
source of gene expression and regulation mechanisms, which can 
be adopted to use in the information and electronic 
communication domains. Conventional security protocols are 
becoming increasingly vulnerable due to more intensive, highly 
capable attacks on the underlying mathematics of cryptography. 
Security protocols are being undermined by social engineering 
and substandard implementations by IT organizations. 
Molecular biology can provide countermeasures to these weak 
points with the current security approaches. Future advances in 
instruments for analyzing assays will also enable this protocol to 
advance from one of cryptographic algorithms to an integrated 
system of cryptographic algorithms and real-time assays of gene 
expression products.   
Keywords—network security; gene expression; transcription 
factors; translation;  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Network security is a vital component of the design of any 
network. There are five main requirements to be addressed in 
developing a secure network: Authentication, confidentiality, 
data integrity, non-repudiation, and access control. In vivo, 
biomolecular cellular systems of gene expression authenticate 
themselves through various means such as transcription factors 
and promoter sequences. These factors also enforce access 
control. They have means of retaining confidentiality of the 
meaning of genome sequences through processes such as 
control of protein expression. They are capable of establishing 
data integrity and non-repudiation through transcriptional and 
translational controls.  
A suite of genomics and proteomics based authentication 
and confidentiality protocols are being developed to augment 
traditional network security approaches with concepts from 
molecular biology via the regulation of gene expression. These 
protocols are agnostic to their implementation and can be 
incorporated into any existing network security protocol 
(Secure http, SSL, TLS, IPSec, etc.) or any future network 
security strategy. The protocols can be implemented for 
implementing web-based security strategies, digital signatures, 
digital rights management, and general purpose encryption for 
data in motion or data at rest. 
Initial implementations will utilize the cryptographic 
algorithms described below. Future implementations will take 
advantage of the ability to access patterns of gene expression in 
vivo. Knowledge of gene expression products (proteins and 
non-coding RNA) can be achieved without time consuming 
sequence assays. It can be done via techniques such as 
fluorescent labeling. In fact the use of fluorescence is one 
method of implementing a protein expression security protocol. 
These protocols will provide new challenges for network 
attackers by forcing them to work in both the information 
security domain and the molecular biology domain. Although 
no security strategy is without vulnerabilities, the intent of this 
work is to present a completely new set of problems for 
network attackers which will result in higher network and 
information security. 
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF A MOLECULAR BIOLOGICALLY BASED 
SECURITY PROTOCOL 
Implementation of this approach utilizes the following 
concepts: 
 A network security concept of operations based upon 
the processes of gene expression. 
 A methodology for taking the processes of gene 
expression and converting them into cryptographic 
protocols (ciphergenes become analogs for biological 
genes, cipherproteins become analogs for biological 
proteins) 
 Specific coding models for the cryptographic protocols 
 Cryptographically hard sources for the patterns of gene 
expression  called ciphercolonies. (ciphercolonies 
become analogs for colonies of living organisms but 
can also contain algorithms substituting for living 
organisms ) 
 Ultimate merging of security protocols with in vivo and 
in vitro realizations of ciphercolonies. Networks of 
ciphercolonies capable of signaling and responding to 
patterns of gene expression within a network and 
authenticating members of the network. 
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Security is based upon the translation of plaintext messages 
to and from a computationally large set of genomic and 
proteomic messages. Instead of relying solely on the four 
nucleotides and 20 amino acids as a code base, messages are 
generated from genomic and proteomic sequences that include 
the informational representation of the regulatory elements of 
transcription and translational networks. A single sequence can 
generate many messages depending upon the transcription and 
translation instructions. Modules can be developed and 
implemented in large or small systems, firewalls, routers, 
switches and other devices. Ultimately, the goal is a network of 
biologically enabled nodes and Certificate Authorities who can 
establish trust via evolving patterns of gene expression. Like 
any security protocol, the most efficient implementation 
requires accommodating its features early in the design phase. 
To accomplish that goal, designers must understand the key 
concepts and future IT security departments will require 
molecular biologists and biochemists on their staffs. 
A. Gene Expression Nomenclature 
Fig.1 summarizes the gene expression process using the -
globin gene [1]. The processes of transcription and translation 
are coded into the protocol.  Each transcript (DNA, RNA, 
protein) has specific regions. Each region is assigned a Type 
and that Type is coded using the Method of Types from 
information theory [2]. The codes interact with each other and 
with codes for the molecular structures required for gene 
expression. This is done using defined probabilities for the 
intersections of the codes for each Type. This allows processes 
such as proteins-nucleotide and protein-protein binding to be 
represented as the intersection of their Types. 
Even if an attacker knows, for example, that the -globin 
gene has been used as a basis for creating a cryptographic 
code, the attacker would have to know the specific location, 
implementation and function of the control regions, and the 
gene expression products to attack a coded message. Even the 
process of finding the start codon in a gene is not trivial, thus 
finding a message encoded in exons without any further 
information is computationally difficult. 
 
Fig. 1. Nomenclature for gene transcription and translation using -globin as 
an example. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Coding the transcriptional complex 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Biological gene structure with a pre-coding substitution of a DNA text 
message into the exon regions 
 
 
Fig. 4 Genomic Proteomic Protocol Overview 
The power of the Method of Types is that it allows for 
certain amount of statistical variability in the interaction of the 
codes which mimics the variability of cellular interactions. 
Fig.2 provides an example of the interpretation of binding of 
the general transcription factor proteins to a gene undergoing 
transcription. In fig.2 all of the transcription factor proteins 
must bind to the correct gene regulatory sequences and other 
transcription factor proteins to permit RNA Polymerase II to 
bind to the entire complex and perform transcription. From a 
coding perspective, all of the codes for these factors have a 
defined probabilities of code intersection that signal successful 
authentication and permit subsequent operations to occur. 
B. Design of the Genomic and Proteomic Protocol suite 
A suite of implementations have been created to date 
include a one-way DNA authentication protocol, a keyed 
HMAC DNA authentication protocol and the genomics and 
proteomics cryptographic suite. The genomics and proteomics 
cryptographic suite begins with a plaintext substitution into 
selected gene motifs, followed by a floating point source 
coding algorithm and multiple rounds of coding on to 
representations of DNA-to-RNA transcription using the Type 
codes for the general transcription factors and RNA-to-proteins 
and with the Type codes for the translation regulatory factors.  
Initially, a precoding step converts the plaintext input into 
an alphabetic string from the set of DNA bases AD = 
{A,T,C,G,MeC,H,X}. A, G, C, and T represent the main DNA 
bases adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine. MeC represents 
5-Methylcytosine, an epigenetic marker, H represents 
hypoxanthine, and X represents xanthine. H and X are 
mutagenic deaminations of DNA bases that occasionally occur 
in gene sequences. Then the protocol provides for the 
following steps. 
 A level 1 process by which DNA text is mapped into 
the structure of a gene complete with introns, exons, 
regulatory regions, etc., to create a ciphergene. The 
purpose of this coding from a security perspective is 
that a single sequence of letters from a small alphabet 
can be used to represent a large set of permutations of 
message combinations. The decoding of such messages 
represents an np-hard problem for attackers. Fig. 3 
provides a simple example of how the encoding process 
begins. In a real application the message could be 
spread across the control regions and different messages 
could be encoded simultaneously across different 
regions.  
 A level 2 process by which ciphergene code is then 
operated on by a series of protein transcription factor 
codes that combine with their counterpart regulatory 
codes on the ciphergene to produce a new coded 
sequence that represents a coded transcriptional 
complex.  
 A level 3 process is a series of operations that takes the 
coded transcriptional complex, which is operated on by 
protein and RNA polymerase codes resulting in a basal 
transcriptional complex code. The basal transcriptional 
complex code is processed by algorithms and maps the 
code into a messenger RNA code, called the cipher-
mRNA code. The cipher-mRNA now consists only of 
codons of the original DNA text message and is 
translated into a protein code, called the cipherprotein. 
The output of level 3 is the cipherprotein code that is 
transmitted from the sender to the receiver. The receiver 
applies the decryption keys to recover the cipher-mRNA and 
then perform all subsequent steps to reach level 2, level 1, and 
decoding to produce the plaintext. The process is summarized 
in fig. 4.   
The protocol uses a series of encryption and decryption 
matrices, E1, E-1, E2, E-2, a series of encryption keys derived 
from pre-shared secret genomic sequences (KT1, KT2, KT3, PT), 
and additional tools from information theory to accomplish 
coding, encrypting, decoding and decrypting the successive 
levels of data [3] 
III. ESTABLISHING AND UTILIZING PATTERNS OF GENE 
EXPRESSION 
A. Utilization of gene expression pathways 
A pattern of gene expression is created by an organism 
going through the processes of DNA transcription and RNA 
translation across the many genes within the genome. Genes 
are always expressed within the context of overall cellular 
requirements. Thus, genes are expressed in response to stimuli 
indicating a need for expression. Not all genes are expressed all 
the time. 
Eukaryotic organisms (yeast, plants, animals, etc.) have 
more complex mechanisms and options for regulating gene 
expression than prokaryotes (bacteria). However, both 
prokaryotic and eukaryotic processes can be used in these 
protocols. Each pathway of gene expression contributes to an 
overall pattern of gene expression. These patterns of gene 
expression can be represented as sets of random variables that 
vary with time. The interaction between the patterns of gene 
expression by different organisms and colonies of organisms 
can also be represented as sets of random variables. Thus, they 
can be modeled using probabilistic and stochastic processes. 
The more complex the organism, the greater the diversity of 
the pattern of gene expression which will contribute to 
diffusion and confusion of the codes generated by the 
protocols. Mutation processes increase the security provided 
these protocols.  
B. Implementation of the protocols in living systems. 
These protocols are designed for eventual implementation 
in cellular organisms and colonies, when the technology is 
ready. By keeping the coding rules consistent with mechanics 
of gene expression, it is expected that there will eventually be 
instruments that read the cryptographic instructions and 
produce gene expression products in vivo. Networks will 
interface with each other over time, such that, as a minimum a 
level of phenotypic recognition can be established between 
networks. Mutation and variation play an important role in the 
security aspects. A Man-In-The-Middle attacker that has not 
been in constant contact with the colonies will be unable to 
match the patterns of gene expression that have evolved over 
time between 2 or more networks that recognize each other. 
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This leads to self-authenticating network interactions as shown 
in fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5. Network Concept of Operations using regulation of gene expression 
 
Networks would have appliance, called a Network BioID. 
Enterprises will maintain Network BioIDs that communicate 
with each other via communication channels (the algorithm 
channel). The ciphercolonies are regularly sampled to measure 
their patterns of gene expression and receive external stimuli 
to modify those patterns of expression. Patterns of gene 
expression occur with the expression of multiple genes which 
interact with each other. Gene A, produces protein A, which 
effects the expression of gene B, which produces protein B, 
etc. This creates a series of gene regulatory networks. In vivo, 
these regulatory networks appear in close proximity to each 
other, within the same cell, or colony of cells through a 
process of cellular signaling. In a computer network, that 
proximity need not be a physical proximity, but a 
communications channel. In vivo, the genes all exist in a 
physical sense within the nucleus or cellular compartment 
housing the DNA. In a computer network, some genes can 
exist in a virtual sense and these genes can communicate with 
the physical ones via a signaling process which alters the 
patterns of expression in both algorithmic and live 
participants.  
Security rests upon maintaining continual knowledge of 
the state of gene expression of the underlying colonies and 
their interactions. For an initial implementation, it is possible 
to monitor and record patterns of gene expression in a 
laboratory over a long baseline period of time, (e.g. 1 year) 
and use that recorded data in place of real-time knowledge of 
patterns of gene expression. Additional data would be 
collected in parallel with consuming the recorded data is being 
consumed, while maintain a one year reserve of gene 
expression data. 
C. Incorporation into legacy networks 
A new concept such as the ones proposed in this research 
will not be accepted unless it can be interfaced into legacy, 
non-bio capable networks.  In fig. 6. Alice and Bob are shown 
using genomic and proteomic authentication in conjunction 
with IPsec. In this case Alice and Bob have Network BioIDs 
incorporating algorithmic and live sources of gene expression 
and a verification method using fluorescence pattern matching 
when gene expression is forced by appropriate stimuli 
 
Fig. 6. Combined legacy and genomic protocol security 
 
Alice and Bob can perform IPsec using nonces and keys 
derived from patterns of gene expression in their 
ciphercolonies unknown to them and to Eve. Alice and Bob 
can perform authentication via messages directing the receiver 
to force expression of gene(s) which can be detected optically 
via fluorescence, successfully as in case (a), or unsuccessfully 
as in case (b). Alice and Bob can send genomically or 
proteomically encrypted messages that cannot be decrypted 
without knowledge of the patterns of gene expression used as 
the basis of encryption. Every network node can be equipped 
with a Network BioID. Eve will need a background in 
molecular biology and cryptography as well as lab resources to 
attack this protocol. Coded patterns of fluorescence detection 
of gene expression can be formed and utilized with current 
technology. This type of security will require organizations to 
take on functions and capabilities very different from those 
currently used in IT departments 
D. Proteomic Authentication Messages 
An IT security official receives a remote request for access 
to network assets from a remote user. The security official 
sends the user a message coded as a protein sequence, by a 
regulatory network using a message-specific set of protein-
DNA Type codes and a source coding scheme based upon a 
keyed hash function tied to a specific genome. The user 
successfully decrypts the message and returns the plaintext 
(which could be encrypted if desired) to the IT security 
official. The IT security official then sends a set of access 
credentials encrypted with a different protein and a different 
genome for the keyed hash code. The user successfully 
decrypts the message to gain access to the network. In this 
scheme, an attacker needs multiple levels of information at the 
genomic and proteomic levels to be able to decode the 
message by cryptanalysis means alone. The process is 
summarized in fig. 7. 
 Fig. 7. Protein Coded Authentication Challenge 
 
E. Modulating patterns of gene expression for security 
Referring to fig. 8, let each bar represent the level of 
expression a group of related genes. Users A and B are 
passing state of expression information back and forth, but the 
patterns become periodic and predictable. The height of the 
bars corresponds to quantities of gene product expression. 
Note that they form a repeating pattern, in which the gene 
expression in the 4th time interval is the same as in the 1st 
time interval. In addition, assume that this pattern continues to 
repeat every 4th time interval. An attacker could easily discern 
this pattern and use it to impersonate either A, B or both. 
Much like a random number generator that produces the same 
random number sequence when provided with the same seed, 
this form of the concept provides no additional security. 
 
Fig. 8. Non secure ciphercolony implementation 
 
In a secure implementation, such as fig. 9, the 
ciphercolonies have a heterogeneous colony of eukaryotes and 
prokaryotes and the patterns of gene expression are constantly 
being modulated by external stimuli.  This creates 
opportunities for new groups of genes to be expressed. The 
patterns do not repeat as evidenced by the new patterns and 
the height of the bars. The stimuli can be applied 
independently of each other or one user can inform another 
user that they are becoming repetitious and either alter their 
behavior or be removed from the network. 
 
Fig. 9. Secure Ciphercolony implementation 
IV. ASPECTS OF PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Technologies for integrating the protocols with laboratory 
analysis of gene expression 
The US Patent that has been secured on the technology is 
forward looking and assumes that full implementation will 
involve future technological advancements that will enhance 
the implementation concepts in the form of laboratory-on-a-
chip devices [4]. The goal of real-time, lab-on-a-chip assays 
for gene expression has already been realized [5].  It is also 
currently possible to use techniques such as dielectrophoretic 
separation of assay products to create signatures of gene 
expression which can be used to create cryptographic codes 
with the genomic and proteomic protocols and low-cost 
devices such as the one shown in fig. 10 [6]. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Dielectrophoretic Separation Test MEMS 
B. Example of implementing protocols into a Public Key 
Infrastructure using a Bio-Certificate Authority 
Fig. 11 demonstrates a concept of operations for 
implementing the protocols within a legacy-style PKI system.  
The purple boxes on each slide refer to blocks in the BioID 
ciphercolony which may or may not be local to the user 
computer performing encryption. The ciphergene ID (CID) is 
essentially an index that points to the name of gene whose 
sequence, transcription, and translation features are used in the 
encryption process. The DNA text message is embedded into 
the gene sequence by the source coding protocol previously 
described. A given message can be encoded differently by 
inserting it into different genes.  
The level 1 process is as follows: The Sender encrypts the 
CID with a Bio-CA generated public key and transmits the 
encrypted CID to a remote Bio-CA.  The Bio-CA decrypts the 
CID with its private key and retrieves a Gene Sequence Key 
Encryption Key (GSK) for the message associated with the 
CID.  The Bio-CA encrypts the GSK with the Sender’s public 
key and transmits the GSK to the Sender.  The Sender 
decrypts the GSK with its private key and retrieves the locus 
control region key (Bio-LCR) from the BioID ciphercolony 
database.  The Bio-LCR is decrypted with the GSK.  The 
DNA text is encrypted with the Bio-LCR, converting the DNA 
text to a ciphergene. The CID is encrypted with the public key 
of the sender and concatenated with the ciphergene.  This 
completes Level 1 encryption.  The ciphertext message can be 
sent to the receiver or sent to level 2 for further processing. 
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Fig. 11. A Public Key Infrastructure implementation using Bio-Certificate Authorities 
